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Abstract. In this paper, a physical layer security analysis of wireless sensor network in 
the presence of an attacker, employing opportunistic scheduling approach, is 
presented. The intended as well as unintended transmission paths experience the 
Weibull fading. A novel analytical expression for the intercept probability is derived. In 
order to emphasize the advantages of the opportunistic scheduling approach, a 
comparative analysis with round-robin and optimal scheduling schemes is also given. 
The impact of a number of active sensors and the impact of fading channel conditions 
over main and wiretap channels on the intercept probabilities is obtained. The 
accuracy of theoretical results is confirmed by independent Monte Carlo simulation 
results. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have a variety of new application purposes 
in Industry 4.0, smart grid, smart cities, smart homes, Internet of Things [1]-[3]. Typically, a 
sensor network consists of an arbitrary number of low-powered sensors in order to sense and 
collect specific data, to process it and forward information to marked sink node. The data 
transmission within sensor network is performed over short distances [4]. In addition, active 
sensors communicate over an open radio medium which as a consequence gives a possibility 
of intruders’ attack and interception of confidential messages [5]. Thus, the security issue is 
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very important in the design of sensor networks [1]. As long as the computing power of the 
attacker is limited, cryptography can enable confidential transmission in user-to-user 
communication. But nowadays, it is more frequent that an unlicensed WSN user owns 
unlimited power and, recalling the brute force attack method [6], can easily break down 
confidential keys. Also, cryptography requires hardware complexity and a large amount of 
energy, which is unfavorable in an energy-aware network such as WSN. 
The physical layer security (PLS) approach, as an alternative to complex cryptography, 
is more suitable for a WSN security issue. According to the PLS, the secrecy capacity can be 
enhanced simply by exploiting characteristics of a propagation channel [5]. The secrecy 
capacity is defined as the difference between the main and wiretap channel capacity [7]. A 
large number of published papers deals with the security issue over fading channels [8]-[12]. 
The Weibull fading model has been adopted as the adequate one in description of 
indoor and outdoor scenarios of practical significance [13], [14]. In [15], the expression 
for average secrecy capacity over Weibull fading channels was derived, but no scheduling 
troubleshoots were analysed. The PLS issue of a dual hop system under asymmetric 
Rayleigh/Weibull and Hoyt/Weibull fading channels was analysed in [8]. 
The probability of intercept is the probability that an intercept event may occur and 
consequently refers that secrecy capacity becomes non positive. Authors in [9] have 
proposed an optimal sensor scheduling scheme of an industrial WSN over Nakagami-m 
fading channels. In [9], a sensor scheduling technique was adopted as a less energy intensive 
technique for the sensor network’s security in order to outperform the conventional relay 
selection [16] or the artificial noise method [17], simultaneously avoiding high implementation 
complexity and saving the sensors’ battery life. In [10] the round-robin (RR) and optimal 
(OP) scheduling schemes were observed for PLS in WSN over Weibull fading channels. 
Further, authors in [11] showed the analysis of secrecy outage probability of WSN involving 
transmission of these scheduling schemes when outdated channel state information (CSI) of 
wiretap channels are available at the sink.  
The opportunistic (OPP) scheduling approach was primarily used in [12] to offer an 
impartial selection of active downlink users in PLS improvement over Rayleigh fading 
channels. Results presented in [18] showed that the OPP scheduling scheme provides a 
better qualitative fairness among users in regard to other scheduling schemes. Although 
the OP scheme aximizes secrecy capacity, it may cause a fairness problem among the 
sensors. Also, battery life of frequently selected sensors becomes an additional problem. 
According to these remarks, we analyse PLS of WSN exploiting the OPP scheduling 
approach over identically distributed Weibull fading channels, in this paper. The 
conventional RR scheduling and OP scheduling schemes were also observed as comparable 
schemes. Basic advantages and disadvantages of the OP scheduling approach are presented 
in terms of intercept probability evaluation. Also, the impact of various systems’ parameters 
on intercept probability is observed and discussed. A novel derived analytical result is 
confirmed by simulations. 
The paper is constructed as follows. In section 2, the system under consideration is 
described and the channel model, over which the confidential transmission is performed in 
the presence of an eavesdropper, is given. Section 3 presents the derivation procedure for 
intercept probability when the OPP scheme is applied. Also, the comparable intercept 
probabilities of RR and OP scheduling schemes are given in section 3. Numerical results and 
the discussion are presented in section 4. Concluding remarks are listed in the final section. 
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2. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL  
In this paper, a WSN containing N active sensors and a sink was discussed. Time 
division multiple access or orthogonal frequency division multiple access can be used in 
communication among each particular sensor and the sink. There is an intruder or an 
unauthorized user trying to overhear confidential data transmission. 
Commonly, a particular sensor-sink channel characterized by the highest data throughput 
is selected for transmission when an orthogonal multiple access method is considered. That 
is the traditional scheduling approach. 
In this paper, the opportunistic scheduling to enhance the physical layer security in 
WSN was involved, concurrently taking into account the fairness among all active WSN 
users. The CSIs of main channels as well as wiretap channels are known at the sink. This 
assumption has been justified in many previously published papers [9], [10], [12]. 
The system, we have analysed, is shown in Fig. 1. Full lines indicate main channels 
communication while the dashed one indicates the unintended transmission. 
 
 
Fig. 1 System model 
 
The instantaneous signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the receive side of ith sensor-sink 










   (1) 
where Pi is the transmission power, hsi is a channel fading coefficient between the ith 
sensor and the sink, and 2si  is a variance of zero-mean additive white Gaussian noise 
(AWGN). 
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The wireless channels between active sensors are corrupted by the Weibull fading. 
Thus, the probability density function (pdf) of SNR over the ith main link has the 
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where si denotes the multipath fading depth parameter of the ith link and 
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We assume the presence of an eavesdropper trying to intercept the transmission of 
selected ith path. We also assume that the attacker has a perfect knowledge of legitimate 
transmissions from each main link, except of the signals that are confidential [9]. So, the 
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with hei being a fading coefficient of the wiretap channel between the ith sensor and 
eavesdropper and 
2
ei  being the variance of AWGN. 
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with ei being the parameter which describes fading depth of the ith wiretapped link and 
ei  being the average wiretapped SNR. 
According to the fact that the distances between neighboring nodes in the network are 
small, values of the fading depth parameter are approximately equal. Thus, in further 
analysis, we will assume identically distributed main as well as wiretap channels, i.e. 
si=ei=. 
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3. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY EVALUATION 
3.1. OPP scheduling scheme 
The instantaneous channel capacity of the ith main link can be evaluated relying on 
the Shannon capacity formula [7], in the following way 
 2( ) log (1 )s siC i   . (6) 
Similarly, the instantaneous channel capacity of the ith wiretap link can be calculated as 
 2( ) log (1 ).e eiC i    (7) 
The secrecy capacity of the ith specific transmission can be defined as a difference 
between the channel capacity of the main and wiretap link, as [9] 
 secrecy ( ) ( ) ( ).s eC i C i C i   (8) 
Consequently, the probability of intercept as the probability that secrecy capacity of the 
ith link becomes non-positive can be defined as [9] 
 int secrecyPr[ ( ) 0] Pr[ ( ) ( )]
i
s eP C i C i C i    . (9) 
By substituting (6) and (7) in (9), and after some manipulations we get 
 int
0 0
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OPP scheduling approach [12] perceives selection fairness of all sensors. The 
scheduling algorithm is based on assigning channel resources according to the cumulative 
distribution function (cdf) values of channel gains. The selection among users is 




 , where 0
( ) ( )
si si
x
si siF x p d     . Thus, the cdf that 
characterize the SNR of ith selected sensor (sel), applying opportunistic scheduling, has 
the following form 
 ( ) [ ( )]
sel si
NF F   . (11) 
Recalling (10), we can reformulate the evaluation of the intercept probability under 
the opportunistic scheduling in the way 
 OPPint
0
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sel e
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. By applying the binomial formula [19], and 
solving the integration of (12) relying to [19, eq. (8.31)], we derive the expression for 
evaluating the intercept probability in the following way 
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with  being the ith average main signal-to-eavesdropper’s signal ratio (MER). 
3.2. Comparable schemes 
In this section, we have formulated the conventional RR and OP scheduling schemes 
in order to give a comparative analysis with the OPP scheduling. 
The scenario in which N sensors randomly access a given transmission channel with 
equal chance for sending sensed data refers to the RR scheduling algorithm. So, by 
randomness, the ith sensor is scheduled to transmit the confidential signal. The probability 
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Traditionally, to maximize the secrecy capacity the OP sensor scheduling scheme can 
be employed. A sensor-sink channel with the highest secrecy capacity is selected to 
transmit confidential data in order to reach the requirements of OP scheduling. According 
to the OP criterion [9], the optimal scheduling intercept probability over Weibull fading 









  (16) 
where int
iP  is defined in (15). 
 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
The intercept probability of the analysed system when the OPP scheduling scheme is 
applied versus MER is illustrated in Fig. 2. We can notice that the intercept probability 
decreases if the number of WSN is increased, as expected. The decrease is more 
pronounced if channel conditions are favorable (i.e. when values of parameter  are 
higher). For instance, when =10dB and number of sensors increases from N=2 to N=5, 
the probability of intercept decrease for an order of magnitude when =1.1, and even 
three orders of magnitude when =3.2 i.e. when confidential transmissions and 
overhearing are both via channels under lighter fading depth. 
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Fig. 2 Intercept probability of the OPP scheduling approach by varying different system 
parameters 
Intercept probabilities of three scheduling approaches are compared under the same 
conditions and presented in Fig. 3. It is evident that in the case of the RR scheduling scheme, 
the intercept probability is constant for all specified values of the MER parameter. The best 
physical layer security performance in terms of low intercept probability values is achieved 
by applying the OP scheduling scheme, as expected. Still, OPP scheduling approach gives 
comparable results with optimal scheduling scheme taking into account the energy saving 
perspective of the opportunistic communication scheme. 
In Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 Monte Carlo simulated results are presented along with the numerical 
results based on (13), (14) and (16). Good agreement of simulations and analytical results 
are noticeable. 
The intercept probability versus  parameter for different scheduling schemes is 
shown in Fig. 4. The Figure confirms that the OP sensor scheduling scheme outperforms 
both the conventional RR as well as OPP scheduling scheme regardless of the current 
channel conditions. Also, as already mentioned, lighter fading channel conditions allow a 
more secure sensor-to-sink communication i.e. lower intercept probability applying each 
of analysed scheduling schemes. By comparing intercept probabilities of the OPP 
scheduling and OP scheduling schemes, we can notice that the performance gain of OP in 
the case of favorable channel conditions is lower. Namely, the performance gain in terms 
of difference of MER values required to reach Pint=10
-5
 applying OP and OPP scheduling 
scheme is about 4dB when =2 and only 2dB when =3. These results can be valuable in 
making decisions about application of the most convenient scheduling scheme regarding 
the tradeoff between improvements of PLS and energy consumption requirements. 
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Fig. 3 Intercept probability versus number of active WSN users for different scheduling 
schemes 
























   RR
   OPP
   OP
 =1  =2  =3
 
Fig. 4 Intercept probability applying different scheduling schemes under different channel 
conditions 
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6. CONCLUSION 
In the paper, we have presented the intercept probability analysis of a sensor network 
employing the OPP sensor scheduling scheme over the Weibull fading environment. 
Presented results also contain the comparative analysis with other scheduling schemes. The 
results showed that the number increase of active WSN users benefits in the case of OPP and 
OP scheduling schemes. Favorable channel conditions are beneficial in term of lower 
intercept probability for each of the employed scheduling schemes. The overall analysis also 
offers good results to select appropriate scheduling approach regarding energy consumption 
requirements. 
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